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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
W. David Paxton *
Gregory R. Hunt **
I. INTRODUCTION
This article looks back on important Virginia labor and em-
ployment law developments during the past year, including sig-
nificant case law and legislation.' Contract issues continued to
dominate state-law employment litigation in Virginia, especially
disputes regarding the enforceability of restrictive covenants.
Section II of this article is devoted to some of the more significant
employment contract cases considered by Virginia state and fed-
eral courts this past year. Section III discusses recent Virginia
cases in which courts have considered Virginia's narrow exception
to the at-will employment doctrine for wrongful discharges that
violate a public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Defama-
tion claims by former employees against their former employers
are in vogue, and Section IV concerns two such recent cases con-
sidered by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Section V discusses a
unique Supreme Court of Virginia case in which an employee
pursued an abuse of process claim against her employer. Finally,
Section VI provides an overview of significant employment-
related legislative activity during the 2007 Session of the Virginia
General Assembly.
* Partner, Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, L.L.P., Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 1976,
Hampden-Sydney College; J.D., 1980, University of Virginia School of Law.
** Associate, Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, L.L.P., Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 1997,
Washington and Lee University; J.D., 2001, University of Richmond School of Law.
1. Federal labor and employment developments, as well as workers' compensation
and public sector employment, are beyond the scope of this article.
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II. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Restrictive Covenants
Given the ever-increasing globalization of the economy, and the
corresponding increase in the mobility of goods and services, more
and more companies are turning to restrictive covenants to pro-
tect the things that give them a competitive advantage-their in-
vestment in people, ideas, and business relationships. Courts in
Virginia have historically been receptive to enforcing reasonably
drawn restrictive covenants, but following the lead of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia in Omniplex World Services Corp. v. US
Investigations Services, Inc.,2 are subjecting these agreements to
greater scrutiny. Consequently, the margin for error when draft-
ing restrictive covenants is getting smaller.
Restrictive covenants such as non-competition and non-
solicitation agreements are disfavored restraints of trade that
will only be enforced if they are: (1) "narrowly drawn to protect
the employer's legitimate business interest;" (2) "not unduly bur-
densome on the employee's ability to earn a living;" and (3) "not
against public policy."3 The focus of most litigation considering
the enforceability of restrictive covenants is the first element-
whether the covenant is narrowly tailored to protect the em-
ployer's legitimate business interests or is overbroad in terms of
temporal or geographic scope or function.4
Such was the case in Lanmark Technology, Inc. v. Canales.5 In
that case, Lanmark sought to enforce the following non-compete
agreement against a former employee:
Employee shall not, for a period of two years following termination of
employment with the Company, assist, as an employee or otherwise,
any competitor to [Lanmark] to obtain business opportunities to per-
form services similar to those provided by [Lanmark] that relates to
2. 270 Va. 246,618 S.E.2d 340 (2005).
3. Id. at 249, 618 S.E.2d at 342 (citing Modem Env'ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 263 Va. 491,
493, 561 S.E.2d 694, 695 (2002); Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561, 580-81, 544 S.E.2d 666,
678 (2001)).
4. See id. at 250, 618 S.E.2d at 343 (concluding that the restrictive covenant at issue
was overbroad and unenforceable because the scope of the restriction was not limited to
employment in actual competition with the former employer).
5. 454 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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(1) a contract or project being performed by [Lanmark], (2) a busi-
ness opportunity that [Lanmark] is pursuing, or (3) a person or or-
ganization for whom [Lanmark] has provided or is providing ser-
vices. 6
The employee had worked for Lanmark performing an inventory
audit for a customer, but was terminated after only five months of
employment. 7 Thereafter, he accepted employment with a com-
pany that had a contract to perform "management and oversight
services" for the same customer he had serviced at Lanmark. s
Lanmark considered the employee's new job to be a breach of the
non-compete agreement and sued its former employee.9 The em-
ployee asserted the non-compete agreement was overbroad and
unenforceable and moved for summary judgment.10
The court concluded that the non-compete was functionally
overbroad, as the scope of services prohibited by the non-compete
far exceeded the services the employee actually performed for
Lanmark during his employment.'1 According to the court, non-
compete clauses that "restrict the former employee's performance
of functions for his new employer [are upheld] only to the extent
that the proscribed functions are the same functions as were per-
formed for the former employer." 2 Because the non-compete pro-
vision at issue prohibited "any form of employment with a com-
petitor, including work unrelated to the employee's work at
Lanmark . . . the non-compete clause far exceed[ed] Lanmark's
legitimate interest." 3 Thus, the non-compete was unenforce-
able. 4
The court also concluded that the non-compete was ambiguous
and susceptible to multiple interpretations because the agree-
ment failed to define several key terms, including the words
"'competitor,' 'business opportunity,' 'services,' 'similar' services,
'perform,' and 'pursuing."'1 5 Because these terms were "capable of
6. Id. at 526-27.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 527.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 529-30.
12. Id. at 528 (quoting Cantol, Inc. v. McDaniel, No. 2:06cv86, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24648, at *14 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2006) (emphasis added)).
13. Id. at 530.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 530-31.
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more than one reasonable construction," and at least one inter-
pretation of these terms caused the non-compete to be function-
ally overbroad, the clause was unenforceable. 16
Parikh v. Family Care Center, Inc. also focused on whether a
restrictive covenant protected the employer's legitimate business
interest.17 This case is unique, however, in that the scope of the
restrictive covenant was not the issue. Instead, the former em-
ployee challenging the covenant asserted that the employer had
absolutely no legitimate business interest in enforcing the cove-
nant. 
18
Parikh involved a lawsuit by a medical practice against a for-
mer physician employee to enforce a covenant not to compete con-
tained in an employment agreement.' 9 The covenant, to which
the physician had agreed, required the physician to pay the prac-
tice $10,000 for each month he competed within twenty miles of
the practice for three years following his departure from the prac-
tice.2 ° At the time the practice hired the physician, it was a pro-
fessional corporation engaged in the practice of medicine in the
Commonwealth of Virginia.2' Another doctor served as the prac-
tice's sole director and shareholder.22 Approximately ten years af-
ter the physician was hired, the practice's director died in an
automobile accident, and his non-physician wife inherited owner-
ship of the practice.23 The physician then left the practice to join a
competing practice located less than one mile away.24
The practice prevailed at a bench trial, and was awarded
$210,000 in damages. 25 The physician appealed, asserting that
the covenant was no longer enforceable because the practice was
no longer authorized to offer medical services and, therefore, had
no legitimate business interest in enforcing the restrictive cove-
nant. 2
6
16. Id. at 531.
17. 273 Va. 284, 288, 641 S.E.2d 98, 100 (2007).
18. Id. at 289, 641 S.E.2d at 100.
19. Id. at 286, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
20. Id. at 287, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 286, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
26. Id. at 287-88, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the physician and
reversed.27 According to the court, because the director's wife was
not a physician, the practice became a non-professional corpora-
tion by operation of law upon the death of the director.28 In the
court's view, Virginia Code section 13.1-542.1 prohibits a non-
professional corporation from engaging in the practice of medicine
in Virginia.29 Because the practice could not engage in the prac-
tice of medicine, it could not compete with the physician, and it
had no legitimate business interest in enforcing the covenant not
to compete. 0
In Devnew v. Flagship Group, Ltd., a former employee sought a
declaratory judgment that non-solicitation and confidentiality
provisions included in his employment agreement with an insur-
ance broker were unenforceable.31 The employee was essentially a
supervisor of the broker's sales agents and had access to confiden-
tial information regarding all of the company's customers. 32 He
negotiated the following non-solicitation agreement with the
company:
(b) For a period of two (2) years following termination of his employ-
ment (whether voluntary or involuntary and whether before or after
the expiration of the term of this Agreement), Employee specifically
agrees not to solicit, divert, accept, nor service, directly or indirectly,
as an insurance solicitor, insurance agent, insurance broker, insur-
ance wholesaler, managing general agent or otherwise, for Em-
ployee's account or the account of any other agent, broker, insurer or
other entity, any insurance or bond business of any kind or character
available from [the company] during Employee's employment with
[the company]:
(i) From any person, firm, corporation, or other entity that is a
customer or account of [the company] during the term of this
Agreement, or
(c) The prohibited conduct . . . shall include, without limitation, (i)
the quoting of premiums or fees, (ii) the furnishing of policy expira-
tions or underwriting or service information (iii) the placing of insur-
ance coverage, (iv) the sale of product(s), or (v) the provision of ser-
27. Id. at 291, 641 S.E.2d at 101.
28. Id. at 287, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
29. Id. at 290, 641 S.E.2d at 101; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-542.1 (Repl. Vol. 2006
& Supp. 2007).
30. Parikh, 273 Va. at 291, 641 S.E.2d at 101.
31. No. CH05-3173, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 291, at *1-2, *11 n.9 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006)
(Norfolk City).
32. Id. at *11-12.
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vices(s), whether such activities result from actions initiated by a
[company] customer or by Employee. 
33
Upon termination of his employment, the employee filed suit, re-
questing that the Norfolk City Circuit Court find this non-
solicitation provision overbroad and unenforceable.34 Specifically,
the employee claimed that the provision was overbroad in func-
tion, as it precluded him from performing certain work for "non-
competitive employers or in a non-competitive capacity."35 The
employee also asserted that the two-year duration, and the fact
that the restriction included no geographic scope, contributed to
the covenant's overbreadth.36
The court disagreed with the employee, finding that the non-
solicitation provision was narrowly tailored to protect the com-
pany's legitimate business interests because it only prohibited the
employee "from engaging in such activities when the conduct is
directed toward a current [company] customer or a former client
from [the employee's] recent employment tenure, and involves in-
surance or bond business available from [the company] during
that time."37 The court further concluded that no geographic limi-
tation was needed, as the covenant was "implicitly limited to the
geographic areas where [the company's] customers are located,"
and held that the two-year term of the covenant was reasonable
under the facts of the case.3' The court also noted that the em-
ployee had "not been unduly restricted in his ability to earn a
livelihood" as he obtained comparable employment shortly after
his termination, and that public policy favored enforcing the
agreement. 3' Thus, the non-solicitation provision was enforce-
able.4°
In evaluating the employment agreement's confidentiality pro-
vision, the court applied the same standard it applied to the non-
solicitation provision: to be enforceable, it must be narrowly tai-
lored.4 The court held that the company had a legitimate interest
33. Id. at *10 n.8.
34. Id. at *1.
35. Id. at *21-22.
36. Id. at *19, *22-23.
37. Id. at *13, *21-22.
38. Id. at *19, *23.
39. Id. at *25-27.
40. Id. at *29-30.
41. Id. at *27-28 (citing Totten v. Employee Benefits Mgmt., Inc., 61 Va. Cir. 77 (Cir.
[Vol. 42:489
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in protecting its confidential information.42 Moreover, in light of
the employee's unfettered access to all of the company's customer
and account information, the scope of the confidentiality provision
at issue did not exceed the company's legitimate business inter-
ests.43 Further, the court found that the confidentiality clause did
not restrict the employee's ability to earn a livelihood and was not
against Virginia public policy.
44
The employee also claimed that a provision of the employment
agreement included a scrivener's error which invalidated the en-
tire agreement. 4' According to the employee, a portion of the
agreement that referred to "selling ventures" should have read
"selling fish."46 The court rejected this claim, noting that the em-
ployee and his counsel had opportunities to review drafts of the
negotiated agreement before it was signed by the parties, and this
language was never questioned. 4 Thus, there was no evidence in
the record to support that an error was made.48
B. Other Contracts
In Khosla v. Global Mortgage., Inc., a Virginia circuit court
found that an arbitration clause contained in an otherwise invalid
employment agreement was nevertheless enforceable.49 The
plaintiff had accepted employment with the defendant mortgage
company as a branch manager and signed an employment agree-
ment in reliance on the company's representation that it had ob-
tained the required licenses to operate in Virginia."° After signing
a five-year lease, hiring five loan officers, paying franchising fees,
and setting up an office (at a cost of approximately $270,000), the
employee learned from the Virginia State Corporation Commis-
sion that the mortgage company's license request had been de-
nied.51 When the employee confronted the company about his
Ct. 2003) (Roanoke County)).
42. Id. at *28.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *29.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 72 Va. Cir. 229, 231 (Cir. Ct. 2006) (Fairfax County).
50. Id. at 229-30.
51. Id. at 230.
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finding, he was ordered to shut down his operation until the
proper licensing could be obtained.5 2 He then sued the mortgage
company for fraud and breach of contract. "
The mortgage company sought to compel arbitration of the dis-
pute based on a clause in the employee's agreement with the
company which stated:
All disputes that cannot be resolved by the parties shall be submit-
ted to binding arbitration to a single arbitrator under the rules and
regulations of the American Arbitration Association or another na-
tionally recognized arbitration organization and judgment on the ar-
bitration award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion.
5 4
The employee argued that the entire contract was invalid because
he was fraudulently induced to sign it; and therefore, the arbitra-
tion clause relied upon by the company was ineffective. 5 The
court recognized that, "[a]s a general rule, a party charged with
fraudulent inducement of a contract may not rely on the terms of
that contract as a defense."56 According to the court, however, ar-
bitration clauses are an exception to this general rule.57 Relying
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the court arrived at the following
three conclusions: (1) "an arbitration provision is severable from
the remainder of the contract;" (2) "unless the challenge is to the
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is con-
sidered by the arbitrator;" and (3) "this arbitration law applies in
state as well as federal courts."" Because the arbitration provi-
sion at issue was severable from the contract, and the employee
did not specifically challenge the validity of the arbitration
clause, the court concluded that the validity of the contract
should be determined by an arbitrator. 9 The court stayed the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 229.
54. Id. at 230.
55. Id. at 230-31.
56. Id. at 231.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46
(2006)).
59. Id.
[Vol. 42:489
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
employee's fraud and breach of contract claims pending arbitra-
tion. o
The company also argued that arbitration of the employee's
claims should take place in Florida and be governed by Florida
law based on choice of venue and choice of law provisions con-
tained in the employee agreement.6 ' Noting that the choice of
venue and choice of law provisions were not contained in the arbi-
tration clause, and that such provisions do not enjoy the same
"separate status" as arbitration clauses, the court found that
these provisions were unenforceable because the employee had
called the validity of the contract into question.62 Thus, the court
held that arbitration was "to take place in Virginia with Virginia
law controlling."63
In JDS Uniphase Corp. v. Jennings, a federal district court ap-
plying Virginia law considered whether an employer had "cause"
to terminate a management level employee. 4 The employee was
employed at-will, meaning he could be terminated at any time
upon reasonable notice, with or without cause.65 Pursuant to a
letter agreement, however, the employee was entitled to six
months pay as severance if he was terminated without cause.66
The agreement defined "cause" as "willful failure ... to comply
with the written or known policies and procedures of the Com-
pany including but not limited to the [Company] Corporate Code
of Business Conduct. 6
7
The employee was fired for intentionally hiring a temporary
employee without consulting with the employer's human re-
sources department, which was a direct violation of company pol-
icy.6" Indeed, the employee reportedly told the company's Senior
60. Id. at 233.
61. Id. at 230-31.
62. Id. at 233.
63. Id. The employer assigned error to the court's determination that the choice of law
and choice of venue provisions were unenforceable, and the Supreme Court of Virginia
granted the employer's appeal on these issues on May 23, 2007. See the Supreme Court of
Virginia, http://www.courts.state.va.us/scv/appeals/070288.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2007). The employee did not appeal the court's finding that the arbitration clause was en-
forceable. See Khosla, 72 Va. Cir. at 231.
64. 473 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708-09 (E.D. Va. 2007).
65. Id. at 708.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 708-09.
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Human Resources Manager that he deliberately ignored the com-
pany's hiring procedures because he believed her department was
"useless."6 9 A senior officer's assessment that the employee "was
unable to work effectively with the rest of [his] team" was also a
factor in the decision to terminate the employee.7 ° The employer
took the position that it had "cause" to terminate the employee
and did not pay him severance. 71
Before the district court, the employee did not deny that he had
deliberately violated the company's hiring policies and proce-
dures, but he claimed that the true reason for his termination
was retaliation for making management aware of company tax
problems.72 Thus, he argued, he was terminated because he was a
"whistleblower," not for "cause," and the company breached the
letter agreement by not paying him severance.73 The court dis-
agreed, holding that "no reasonable fact finder could conclude
[that the employee] was terminated without cause."74 In the
court's opinion, the fact that the employee had admitted to will-
fully disregarding company policy was dispositive, as this action
amounted to "cause" under the letter agreement.7 5 Therefore, the
employee's breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law.76
III. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
A. Bowman Claims
Although Virginia strongly adheres to the employment-at-will
doctrine, courts recognize a very narrow exception for wrongful
discharges that violate public policy.77 These claims, known as
69. Id. at 708.
70. Id. at 709.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The employee's breach of contract claim was actually a counterclaim in re-
sponse to breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and misappropriation of
trade secrets claims raised by the employer. Id. at 706. The court did not address the em-
ployer's claims in its opinion. See id. at 706-07. The employee also asserted a counterclaim
under the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, which is beyond the scope of
this article. See id.
74. Id. at 709.
75. Id. at 709-10.
76. See id. at 710
77. Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 263 Va. 209, 213, 559 S.E.2d 709, 710-11 (2002).
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"Bowman claims" after the case in which the Supreme Court of
Virginia first recognized them,7" are only viable in three limited
circumstances: (1) where "an employer violated a policy enabling
the exercise of an employee's statutorily created right;"79 (2)
"when the public policy violated by the employer was explicitly
expressed in the statute and the employee was clearly a member
of that class of persons directly entitled to the protection enunci-
ated by the public policy;"80 or (3) "where the discharge was based
on the employee's refusal to engage in a criminal act."" As a re-
sult, unlike other jurisdictions, Virginia has seen few of these
"public policy" discharge claims in recent years.
In McFarland v. Virginia Retirement Services of Chesterfield,
L.L.C., a Virginia federal district court considered a Bowman
claim. 2 In that case, the plaintiff, an employee of a retirement
community, alleged that she was terminated for telling a state
investigator that her employer had taken residents of the retire-
ment community on an "outside excursion in 95 degree
weather."8 3 The plaintiff characterized such actions as abuse of
aged adults, which by virtue of her position with the company she
was required to report pursuant to Virginia Code section 63.2-
1606.' The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia found that these allegations stated a wrongful dis-
charge claim under both the first and second circumstances rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court of Virginia."
The court first found that, if the employee's allegations were
true, her discharge violated a public policy enabling the exercise
of a statutorily created right.6 The court determined that the
public policy underlying Virginia Code section 63.2-1606 was the
"protection, care, and well-being of Virginia's aged adults."" Fur-
ther, this statute conferred upon the plaintiff the right (and the
78. Id., 559 S.E.2d at 710 (citing Bowman, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797).
79. Id. at 213-14, 559 S.E.2d at 711 (citing Bowman, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797).
80. Id. at 214, 559 S.E.2d at 711 (citing Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121,
480 S.E.2d 502 (1997); Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 439
S.E.2d 328 (1994)).
81. Id. (citing Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 190, 523 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2000)).
82. 477 F. Supp. 2d 727, 730 (E.D. Va. 2007).
83. Id. at 730, 732.
84. Id. at 733-34 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1606(A)(5), (6) (Repl. 2007)).
85. Id. at 733-36; see generally supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
86. McFarland, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 733.
87. Id.
2007]
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obligation) to report suspected abuse of aged adults to further the
public policy behind the statute.88 Accordingly, terminating an
employee for exercising her right to report suspected abuse would
violate Virginia public policy. 89
The court next noted that, if the employee's allegations were
true, her termination would also be a violation of a public policy
explicitly expressed in a statute. 9° The court relied upon Virginia
Code sections 63.2-1730 and 63.2-1731, which prohibit retaliation
or discrimination against any person who reports abuse or neglect
of the aged, as sources of this explicitly expressed public policy. 91
According to the court, these statutes expressly convey that it is a
public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia to protect persons
responsible for the care of aged adults.92 As the employee was a
member of the class of persons the statutes were designed to pro-
tect, she stated a wrongful discharge claim. 9
3
The court also briefly considered whether the employee had
stated a wrongful discharge claim under the third set of circum-
stances recognized by the Supreme Court of Virginia-refusal to
engage in a criminal act.94 The court noted that the employee did
not allege that her employer had asked her to commit a crime or
that she was terminated for refusing to engage in a criminal
act. 95 Therefore, she could not state a claim for wrongful dis-
charge under the third set of circumstances.96
B. Constructive Discharge
The question of whether this narrow, judicially created "public
policy" exception to the at-will doctrine extends to circumstances
88. Id. at 733-35 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1606(A)--(B), (F) (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
89. Id. at 733, 735. But cf. Rowan, 263 Va. at 215, 559 S.E.2d at 711-12 (holding that
statute prohibiting obstruction of justice conferred no right on employee to be free from
intimidation and could not serve as a source of a public policy to support a wrongful dis-
charge claim); Dray v. New Mkt. Poultry Prods., Inc., 258 Va. 187, 191, 518 S.E.2d 312,
313 (1999) (noting that Virginia does not recognize a general common-law "whistleblower"
retaliation claim).
90. McFarland, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 735-36.
91. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.2-1730, -1731 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
92. Id. at 736.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 736 n.4.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see generally supra text accompanying note 81.
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where an employee resigns, as opposed to being discharged, re-
mains a matter of debate. The Supreme Court of Virginia has not
squarely addressed whether such a "constructive discharge" claim
is viable, and the state and federal courts that have considered
the issue are split.97 In three recent companion cases from the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
Johnson v. Paramont Manufacturing, LLC,9" Watson v. Paramont
Manufacturing, LLC,99 and Hill v. Paramont Manufacturing,
LLC, 10 Senior United States District Judge Glen M. Williams
weighed in on the debate, concluding that the Supreme Court of
Virginia would recognize a constructive discharge cause of ac-
tion. 0'
IV. DEFAMATION
Defamation claims are fast becoming a preferred cause of ac-
tion for employees seeking to hold employers accountable for their
conduct. Two recent defamation cases in which juries returned
sizeable awards for employees, Government Micro Resources, Inc.
v. Jackson'' and Raytheon Technical Services Co. v. Hyland,'
underscore this trend and highlight the considerable risk employ-
ers face in making negative statements regarding their employ-
ees.
In Government Micro Resources, Inc., the Supreme Court of
Virginia considered allegations of defamation by a former execu-
tive employee against his former employer and the company's
owner for statements the owner made regarding the circum-
stances leading to the executive's termination.0 4 The executive
had served as the company's president and chief executive offi-
97. Compare Padilla v. Silver Diner, 63 Va. Cir. 50, 57 (Cir. Ct. 2003) (Virginia Beach
City) (recognizing constructive discharge claim), with Dixon v. Denny's Inc., 957 F. Supp.
792, 798-99 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding constructive discharge not actionable under Virginia
law).
98. No. 1:05cv00079, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67735 (W.D. Va. Sept. 21, 2006).
99. No. 1:05cv00080, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78100 (W.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2006).
100. No. 1:05cv00082, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78488 (W.D. Va. Oct. 18, 2006).
101. Hill, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78488, at *11; Watson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78100,
at *11; Johnson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67735, at *16.
102. 271 Va. 29, 624 S.E.2d 63 (2006).
103. 273 Va. 292, 641 S.E.2d 84 (2007).
104. 271 Va. at 35-37, 624 S.E.2d at 66-67.
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cer.10 5 He alleged that, upon his termination, the company's
owner told a customer that the executive had "mismanaged" the
company, cost the owner "an exorbitant amount of money," and
had been removed from his job because he "lost $3 million." °6 The
trial testimony of the customer's executives confirmed substan-
tially similar statements were made.' 7 The owner testified that
he did not make the statements, but acknowledged that "it would
be false if someone said that."118 A jury found in favor of the for-
mer executive, and awarded him $5 million in compensatory
damages and $1 million in punitive damages on his defamation
claim.' 9 On the company's motion, the court reduced the award
to $1 million in compensatory damages and reduced the punitive
damages award to the statutory cap of $350,000.11° Both sides
appealed. 11
The company and its owner argued to the Supreme Court of
Virginia that the owner's statements were expressions of opinion
and, thus, not defamatory as a matter of law." 2 According to the
defendants, the terms "exorbitant" and "mismanaged" in these
statements illustrated that the statements were merely expres-
sions of the owner's subjective judgment, not statements of fact. 113
The court disagreed, concluding that the causes of the company's
financial losses could be proved, and were proved, by the evi-
dence. "4 Thus, the statements alleged were capable of being
proven true or false and were not expressions of opinion."' The
defendants also asserted that the statement that the executive
had "mismanaged" the company and cost the owner "an exorbi-
tant amount of money" was not timely raised, as it was not in-
cluded in the executive's complaint or bill of particulars." 6 The
trial court had determined that this statement was "essentially
105. Id. at 36, 624 S.E.2d at 66.
106. Id. at 37, 624 S.E.2d at 67.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 35, 624 S.E.2d at 66. The executive's lawsuit also included a breach of con-
tract claim for which the jury awarded him $200,500 in compensatory damages. Id. The
court reduced this award to $112,500. Id. Neither party appealed this result. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 40, 624 S.E.2d at 68.
113. Id.
114. Id., 624 S.E.2d at 69.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 39, 624 S.E.2d at 68.
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the same allegation" that the executive had made in his bill of
particulars, and the supreme court concurred." 7
The defendants further challenged the sufficiency of the former
executive's evidence to establish that the defamatory statements
had been made, as well as the evidence that the defendants had
acted with malice to support a punitive damage award.'18 The de-
fendants contended that, because the witnesses to the defamatory
statements could not recall the exact words used by the owner,
the executive failed to carry his burden of proof."9 The court
noted that defamatory statements must only "be substantially
proven as alleged" and found that the recollections of the wit-
nesses, as well as the executive's testimony regarding his conver-
sations with the witnesses, were sufficient to satisfy this stan-
dard. 120 As for evidence of malice, the defendants argued that the
executive had to "produce clear and convincing proof that there
were reasons for a defendant to doubt the veracity of the defama-
tory statement or that all judgment and reason were abandoned
and no objective basis existed for the defamatory charge." 12' The
court characterized this as a misstatement and misapplication of
law.'22 The executive needed only to prove by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the owner "either knew the statements he made
were false at the time he made them, or that he made them with
a reckless disregard for their truth."'23 In the court's opinion,
there was clear and convincing evidence that the owner knew the
defamatory statements to be false at the time he made them. 1
24
The supreme court also reinstated the jury's $5 million com-
pensatory damages award for defamation.'25 The trial court's ex-
117. Id. But see Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, 265 Va. 127, 134, 575 S.E.2d 858,
862 (2003) (A pleading alleging defamation must set out the exact words in haec verba.
(citing Fed. Land Bank of Balt. v. Birchfield, 173 Va. 200, 215, 3 S.E.2d 405, 410 (1939))).
118. Id. at 41, 624 S.E.2d at 69.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Birchfield, 173 Va. at 215, 3 S.E.2d at 410).
121. Id. at 42, 624 S.E.2d at 70.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Ingles v. Dively, 246 Va. 244, 253, 435 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1993)).
124. Id. at 43, 624 S.E.2d at 70. The defendants also argued that the statements were
entitled to a qualified privilege because they were made in good faith, but the court found
that any such privilege would have been lost because the jury determined that the defen-
dants acted with actual malice. Id. at 43-44, 624 S.E.2d at 70-71. For this reason, the
court did not address the defendants' argument that a qualified privilege protected the
statements. Id. at 43, 624 S.E.2d at 70-71.
125. Id. at 35, 49, 624 S.E.2d at 66, 74.
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planation for setting aside the jury award was that it perceived
the jury was confused as to the types of injuries for which the ex-
ecutive could recover on his defamation claim.126 In support of its
conclusion of jury confusion, the trial court noted that the jury
had included $88,000 as part of its breach of contract award that
was indisputably related to the defamation claim. 127 The trial
court also noted the jury instructions "led the jury to include in
the defamation award emotional distress damages that arose not
from the defamation, but from [the executive's] termination," 128
and "the jury improperly included in the defamation award eco-
nomic injuries [the executive] had identified as flowing from his
loss of employment." 129 The supreme court found that, with the
exception of the $88,000 that was improperly allocated, there was
no evidence in the record to support that the jury was confused. 3 °
Further, in the court's judgment, the $5 million award was not
excessive in light of the evidence presented at trial as to the de-
famatory statements' impact on the executive's emotional state,
reputation, and employment opportunities, which had to be con-
strued in the light most favorable to the executive. 131
In Raytheon Technical Services Co., the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia considered whether five statements made by an employee's
supervisor in a written performance evaluation, which were later
published to the CEO of the employer's parent company, were de-
famatory. 132 The conflict between the employee and her supervi-
sor began after the employee gave a "confidential" assessment of
her supervisor's abilities, which included some negative feedback,
to a consulting firm hired to evaluate the supervisor. 133 The su-
pervisor heard about the employee's statements to the consult-
ants, and shortly thereafter, presented the employee with a per-
formance evaluation that included several negative comments. 134
The employee, who had been with the employer for twenty-one
126. Id. at 45, 624 S.E.2d at 72.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 45-46, 624 S.E.2d at 72.
129. Id. at 46, 624 S.E.2d at 72.
130. Id. at 45-46, 624 S.E.2d at 72.
131. Id. at 45, 48, 624 S.E.2d at 71, 73-74.
132. 273 Va. 292, 296, 298, 641 S.E.2d 84, 86-88 (2007).
133. Id. at 297, 641 S.E.2d at 87.
134. Id. at 297-98, 641 S.E.2d at 87.
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years and promoted to a senior management position, had never
before received an unfavorable performance evaluation. 135
The supervisor later fired the employee and used the negative
performance recited in the evaluation to justify his decision.'36
The employee then sued the supervisor and her employer for
defamation, among other claims.' 37 On the defamation claim, five
statements contained in the negative performance evaluation
were submitted to the jury, which returned an award of $1.5 mil-
lion in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive dam-
ages for the employee.'3
The employer and supervisor appealed, asserting that per-
formance reviews, by nature, set forth the opinions of an evalua-
tor, which are not actionable as defamation.'39 The Supreme
Court of Virginia, however, refused to adopt a blanket exclusion
precluding the use of performance reviews as a source of defama-
tory statements, and it separately evaluated the five statements
to determine whether each was a non-actionable expression of
opinion or an actionable statement of fact. 140
The court found that the following two statements were prova-
bly true or false and, thus, were statements of fact that could
serve as a basis for a defamation claim:
[1] Cynthia and her team met their cash goals, but were significantly
off plan on all other financial targets including Bookings by 25%,
Sales by 11.5%, and profits by 24%.
[2] Cynthia lead [sic] RTSC in the protest of the FAA's evaluation se-
lection process for the TSSC contract and through a difficult pro-
curement for the TSA, both of which demanded her constant atten-
tion. These visible losses created significant gaps in our strategic
plans and in her business unit financial performance. 141
135. Id. at 296-98, 641 S.E.2d at 86-87.
136. Id. at 298, 641 S.E.2d at 88.
137. Id. at 299, 641 S.E.2d at 88.
138. Id. The court reduced the punitive damage award to the statutory cap of $350,000.
Id. at 300, 641 S.E.2d at 88.
139. Id. at 300, 302, 641 S.E.2d at 88, 90.
140. Id. at 303-04, 641 S.E.2d at 91.
141. Id. at 304-05, 641 S.E.2d at 91.
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Because these were statements of fact, not expressions of opinion,
they were properly submitted to the jury.'42
The court found, however, that the following three statements
were "not susceptible to proof as a matter of fact" and, therefore,
were expressions of opinion:
[3] Cynthia is frequently verbose and vocal in her opinions, to a de-
gree that others stop participating in open dialogue.
[4] She has received specific feedback from her customers, the Bea-
con group study, her employees, and her leader on her need to listen
and learn from others, yet she has appeared to be unwilling to accept
and work with this feedback.
[5] Cynthia has also been inappropriately and openly critical of her
leader, her peers, and other leaders in the company. This behavior is
not only destructive to the team, it negatively impacts her image in
the eyes of others, including customers. 1
43
According to the court, the third statement was an expression of
opinion because it was a matter of perspective whether the em-
ployee's "verbose and vocal" opinions caused others not to partici-
pate.'" Similarly, the court found that the fourth statement was
an expression of the supervisor's perspective that the employee
"appeared to be unwilling," which made the statement neither
provably true, nor provably false."'4 As for the fifth statement, the
court found that it contained both fact and opinion, but ultimately
concluded that the statement as a whole conveyed the supervi-
sor's opinion that the employee's criticism of others was "inappro-
priate."'46 Therefore, the trial court erred in submitting these
statements to the jury.'47 Because the supreme court could not
determine which of the five statements the jury relied upon for its
verdict, the judgment was set aside and the case remanded for a
new trial.'48
142. Id. at 305, 641 S.E.2d at 91.
143. Id. at 305-06, 641 S.E.2d at 92.
144. Id. at 305, 641 S.E.2d at 92.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 305-06, 641 S.E.2d at 92.
147. Id. at 306, 641 S.E.2d at 92.
148. Id.
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V. ABUSE OF PROCESS
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered an employee's abuse
of process claim against her employer and the company's owner in
Montgomery v. McDaniel.'49 The dispute between the parties
originated with an internal complaint of sexual harassment and
assault and battery by the employee's daughter, who was also
employed with the company, against the company's owner.150 In
connection with this complaint, the owner consented to discipli-
nary action, was relieved of his duties, and signed an agreement
promising not to enter the company's premises or contact any
company employee.' 5 ' After just one month, however, the owner
repudiated the agreement and returned to the company.'52 The
employee's daughter then sued the company and its owner, rais-
ing a variety of claims.'53 In response, the owner filed cross claims
against the daughter, as well as third-party claims against the
employee and four other employees."' The four other employees
then responded with their own cross claims against the company
and its owner.'55 Eventually, the owner and his company non-
suited their claims against the employee and either non-suited or
dismissed their claims against the other company employees. 
156
Shortly after the owner and the company non-suited their
claims against the employee, she filed a separate lawsuit for
abuse of process, alleging that the owner and the company had
sued her merely to gain leverage to force her daughter to with-
draw her lawsuit.'57 The trial court sustained the demurrer of the
149. 271 Va. 465,467, 628 S.E.2d 529, 530-31 (2006).
150. Id.
151. Id., 628 S.E.2d at 531.
152. Id. He also placed the company's chief financial officer, who had confronted the
owner about the harassment, on administrative leave, as well as three other employees.
Id., 628 S.E.2d at 530-31.
153. Id. at 467-68, 628 S.E.2d at 531. The daughter's claims included compensatory
and punitive damages for the assault and battery, as well damages for fraud. Id. She also
sought a declaratory judgment that the owner had given her ownership rights in the com-
pany and other entities, and sought an accounting and imposition of a constructive trust
for these entities. Id.
154. Id. at 468, 628 S.E.2d at 531. The owner's claims included tortious interference
with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, common law and
statutory conspiracy, breach of contract, and breach of employment duties and responsi-
bilities. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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owner and his company. 158 In affirming the decision of the trial
court, a majority of the Supreme Court of Virginia determined
that the facts alleged by the employee did not establish the requi-
site elements of an abuse of process claim: "(1) the existence of an
ulterior purpose; and (2) an act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings."15 9 While the
employee's complaint included ample allegations to support the
contention that the owner and his company had an ulterior mo-
tive for suing the employee, in the court's opinion, the employee's
allegations did not support that the owner and the company had
engaged in acts "not proper in the regular prosecution of the pro-
ceedings."'6 0 The majority rejected the employee's argument that
the decision to nonsuit the lawsuit rather than dismiss it with
prejudice was an improper use of process, as this is a statutory
right conferred by the General Assembly.'61 Further, the fact that
the owner had continued to pursue his cross-bill against the em-
ployee after conceding that one of his claims failed was not an
improper use of process where his remaining claims remained vi-
able. 62 Finally, the owner's refusal to turn over the full text of a
settlement agreement until ordered to do so by the court was, in
the majority's opinion, a "routine use of process," not an improper
use of process.163
Justice Lemons penned a strong dissent, in which Chief Justice
Hassell joined, disagreeing with the majority's determination that
the owner's refusal to timely turn over the settlement agreement
in its entirety was not an improper use of process.' 64 Justice Lem-
ons observed that the employee had alleged more than mere fail-
ure to turn over the settlement document; she alleged that the
owner had only turned over "a self-serving portion" of the docu-
ment in an attempt to conceal certain portions of the agreement,
"well knowing that revealing those provisions would eliminate
any chance of prevailing" at an upcoming hearing.'65 He reasoned
158. Id.
159. Id. at 469, 471, 628 S.E.2d at 531-33 (quoting Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Mount
Vernon Assocs., 235 Va. 531, 539, 369 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1988)).
160. Id. at 469, 628 S.E.2d at 531-32 (quoting Donohoe Constr. Co., 235 Va. at 539, 369
S.E.2d at 862).
161. Id. at 470, 628 S.E.2d at 532.
162. Id. at 469-70, 628 S.E.2d at 532.
163. Id. at 470-71, 628 S.E.2d at 532-33.
164. Id. at 471-73, 628 S.E.2d at 533-34 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 472, 628 S.E.2d at 534.
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that such conduct, if true, amounts to obstruction of discovery.166
In Justice Lemons's opinion, "lain allegation involving an abuse
of discovery which increases the cost of litigation surely must
qualify as 'an improper use of process,' especially where the im-
proper motive is financial coercion."167
VI. SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Minimum Wage
Perhaps the most closely watched labor and employment legis-
lation during the 2007 Session of the General Assembly were the
numerous proposals to increase the Commonwealth's minimum
wage.16 At the end of the 2007 Session, all of these proposals re-
mained in committee, leaving Virginia's minimum wage at the
rate set by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. 169
The General Assembly did, however, make a change to the Vir-
ginia Minimum Wage Act. Previously, persons aged 65 or older
were excluded from the Act's definition of "employee."170 Accord-
ingly, the Act's provisions and remedies did not apply to such per-
sons. During the 2007 Session, the General Assembly removed
the exclusion for persons sixty-five or older. 1
71
166. Id. at 473, 628 S.E.2d at 534.
167. Id.
168. See H.B. 1634, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); H.B. 1651, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly (Reg. Sess. 2007); H.B. 1654, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); H.B. 2004, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); H.B. 2508, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); H.B. 2849,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); H.B. 2873, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007);
H.B. 3054, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); S.B. 766, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
2007); S.B. 1277, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); S.B. 1327, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2007).
169. See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.10 (Repl. Vol. 2002). The current federal minimum
wage is $5.85 per hour. Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 188
(to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)). Effective July 24, 2008, the federal minimum wage
will increase to $6.55 per hour. Id. The minimum wage increases to $7.25 per hour on July
24, 2009. Id.
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.9(B)(11) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
171. Act of Mar. 25, 2007, ch. 832, 2007 Va. Acts 1331 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.9 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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B. Obtaining Employee Criminal Records
Amendments to Virginia Code section 19.2-389 make it a little
easier for employers and prospective employers to obtain criminal
conviction information regarding employees or potential employ-
ees. Previously, pursuant to section 19.2-389, most employers
could only directly obtain criminal histories for employees whose
job duties required that they enter the homes of others. 7 2 Indi-
viduals, however, could request copies of their own criminal re-
cords,' 73 and employers often circumvented the restrictions of sec-
tion 19.2-389 by requiring employees to provide such information.
The General Assembly's revisions to Virginia Code section 19.2-
389 permit employers and prospective employers to directly re-
quest records of criminal convictions, at the employer's cost, for
employees or prospective employees, provided that the employee
or prospective employee has consented to the request in writ-
ing. 174
C. Leave to Attend Criminal Proceedings
The General Assembly enacted a new statute that requires
employers to grant leave to employees who are victims of crimes
to attend related criminal proceedings. 175 The employee must pro-
vide notice to the employer of the need for leave by copy of a form
provided by the relevant law enforcement agency. 176 Employees
are only entitled to leave if they, as crime victims, have a right or
opportunity to appear at the proceeding. 177 The term "proceeding"
is not limited to criminal trials, but is broadly defined to include
initial appearances and hearings regarding bail, plea deals, sen-
tencing, and probation. 1
78
An employer does not have to compensate an employee for time
missed to attend criminal proceedings.' 79 Further, an employer
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389(A)(34) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
173. Id. § 19.2-389(A)(11) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
174. Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 361, 2007 Va. Acts 497 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-389(H) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
175. Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 423, 2007 Va. Acts 590 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-28.7:2 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
176. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
177. Id. § 40.1-28.7:2(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 40.1-28.7:2(D) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
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may "limit" an employee's leave if it would create an "undue hard-
ship," which the statute defines as "significant difficulty and ex-
pense to a business" in "consideration of the size of the employer's
business and the employer's critical need of the employee."' 8° The
statute also includes anti-retaliation and discrimination provi-
sions that prohibit employers from taking adverse employment
action against employees or prospective employees who have ex-
ercised their rights under the statute.18'
D. Employment of Minors
The General Assembly revised Virginia Code section 40.1-113
to substantially increase the maximum civil penalty for child la-
bor offenses that result in the serious injury or death of a child."8 2
Previously, a civil penalty for any violation of the child labor laws
could not exceed $1,000.'83 The 2007 revisions to section 40.1-113
raise the ceiling for offenses that result in the serious injury or
death of a child to $10,000.114 The ceiling for civil penalties for
other child labor violations remains at $1,000.185
E. Payroll Deduction for Support Payments
Many Virginia employers subject to court orders to withhold
employee wages for support payments must now remit those
wages to the Department of Social Services by electronic funds
transfer. 8 6 Pursuant to amendments to Virginia Code section 20-
79.3, employers with at least 100 employees, and all payroll proc-
essing firms with at least fifty clients, can no longer mail pay-
ments to the Department, but must use electronic funds transfer
to remit such payments within four days of the pay date.'87
180. Id. § 40.1-28.7:2(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
181. Id. § 40.1-28.7:2(E) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
182. Act of Mar. 20, 2007, ch. 667, 2007 Va. Acts 1017 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-113 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
183. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-113(A) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
184. Id. (Cum. Supp. 2007).
185. Id.
186. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79.3(A)(12) (Cum. Supp. 2007).
187. Id. The statute contains no guidance as to how to calculate an employer's total
number of employees to determine whether specific employers fall under this requirement.
See id.
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F. Virginia Employment Commission Payroll and Tax Reports
In a similar effort designed to reduce the amount of paper re-
cords processed by the Commonwealth, the General Assembly
enacted legislation to require more employers to file payroll and
tax reports with the Virginia Employment Commission ('VEC")
electronically. 8 Currently, employers with 250 or more employ-
ees in any calendar quarter must file payroll and tax reports by
"magnetic medium."" 9 Effective January 1, 2009, all employers
with 100 or more employees must file quarterly payroll and tax
reports on an electronic medium prescribed by the VEC.' 90 Waiv-
ers of this requirement are available if the employer can demon-
strate it creates an "unreasonable burden." '191
G. Rights of Military Service Members
Virginia Code sections 44-93.2 through 44-93.5 provide certain
rights and protections to military service members, including the
right to take unpaid leave for military service, restoration rights,
and the right to be free from discrimination or retaliation for
their military service.192 Previously those rights and protections
only extended to members of the Virginia National Guard, the
Virginia State Defense Force, and the naval militia called to ac-
tive duty by the governor.'93 The General Assembly has expanded
the scope of these Virginia Code sections to include those called to
active duty by the federal government pursuant to Title 32 of the
United States Code. 194 The General Assembly also added a provi-
sion that enables employees to recover reasonable attorney's fees
and costs incurred because of an employer's violation of these
statutes. 195
188. See Act of Mar. 20, 2007, ch. 638, 2007 Va. Acts 970 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 60.2-512(B) (2007)).
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-512(B) (Supp. 2007).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-93.2 to 44-93.5 (Cum. Supp. 2007).
193. Id. (Repl. Vol. 2002).
194. See Act of Mar. 9, 2007, ch. 214, 2007 Va. Acts 303 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-93.2 to 44-93.5 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
195. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 44-93.5 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most talked about Virginia employment law case
this past year was the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision up-
holding the $5 million compensatory damage award for defama-
tion in Government Micro Resources, Inc. v. Jackson.'96 This case,
as well as the $1.5 million jury award for defamation in Raytheon
Technical Services Co. v. Hyland,'97 raised the eyebrows of many
labor and employment attorneys in the Commonwealth, both
from the plaintiffs' and the defense bars. Where in the past, defa-
mation claims were oftentimes an afterthought in employment
litigation, expect that plaintiffs' attorneys will now look for cir-
cumstances in which to assert a defamation claim against em-
ployers. An increase in the volume of employment-related defa-
mation claims in light of these jury verdicts would not be
surprising.
There seems to be an ever-increasing amount of litigation in
state and federal courts across the Commonwealth considering
the enforceability of restrictive covenants, which is a reflection
that employees are becoming more aggressive in challenging such
restrictions, either by obtaining competing employment or seek-
ing declaratory relief. These agreements can be enforceable if
narrowly tailored, as illustrated by Devnew v. Flagship Group,
Ltd. 9' It seems that more often than not, however, employers try
to overreach, and the result is an unenforceable covenant as in
Lanmark Technology, Inc. v. Canales.'99
It was a slow year for labor and employment-related legislation
in Virginia, as the most closely watched labor legislation-the
numerous and varied proposals to increase the minimum wage-
never made it out of committee. But expect this debate to con-
tinue during the 2008 Session, as more and more states raise
their minimum wage, putting pressure on the General Assembly
to do the same for Virginia's workers.
196. 271 Va. 29, 43, 624 S.E.2d 63, 70 (2006).
197. 273 Va. 292, 299, 641 S.E.2d 84, 88 (2007).
198. No. CH05-3173, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS 291, at *13, *27 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006) (Nor-
folk City).
199. 454 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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